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Summary. — This article tests the hypothesis that higher women’s economic and 
social rights in foreign countries with which a country is connected via trade and FDI 
spill-over into higher rights among the laggards — a phenomenon known as spatial 
dependence. Analyzing women’s rights over the period 1981 to 2007 in a global 
sample and samples of countries at different stages of economic development, we find 
consistent evidence for spill-over effects via trade links, with the exception of a 
sample of low-income countries. We also find some evidence for similar effects via 
FDI, but only for economic rights and only in middle-income countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The empowerment of women, understood as ensuring that women can fully enjoy the 
same rights as men and are not discriminated against, is normatively desirable. It is 
also instrumentally valuable because it promotes economic development if women 
can flourish and freely develop their full potential as talented and productive workers, 
mothers, care givers, and often more responsible managers of households than men in 
many countries (King and Mason, 2001; Sen, 1999; UNIFEM, 2008). Radical sceptics 
of globalization, among them many feminist writers and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), warn of the ‘masculinity’ of ‘corporate globalization’ leading 
to subjugation of women across the world (Chafetz, 1984; Ward, 1984; Shiva, 2005; 
Enloe, 2007; Klein, 2007). Christa Wichterich (2000: 167), for example, argues that 
the ‘globalized woman is burnt up as a natural fuel: she is the piece-rate worker in 
export industries (…) the voluntary worker who helps to absorb the shocks of social 
cutbacks and structural adjustment.’ According to this view, globalization may have a 
particularly pernicious effect on the economic, social, and political life of women as 
profit-hungry corporations break down communitarian values and interests and breed 
hardships for the weak, particularly women (Parpart, Shirin & Staudt, 2002; 
Wichterich, 2000). Of course, there are other voices, equally critical of globalization, 
but providing a more nuanced view and more rigorous analysis, in which the critique 
is about how the gender inequalities entrenched and promoted by the exploitative 
nature of the trans-national capitalist system and the asymmetric bargaining power 
between (foreign) corporations on the one hand and governments, workers and civil 
society groups on the other (see, for example, Van Staveren, Elson, Grown & Çağatay 
(2007) and the many references cited in this edited volume). 
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Contrarily, there are others who argue that globalization liberates women by 
providing opportunities through trade and investment, precisely because profit-hungry 
corporations hire the best workers without adhering to traditional social mores that 
typically privilege men. They argue that higher standards and better rights will spill-
over to laggard countries, not least because of increased opportunities for employment 
and sensitivity of markets to wishes of the consumers in developed countries 
(Bhagwati, 2004; Spar, 1998; Spar and Yoffie, 1999). The level of globalization 
might also determine a country’s vulnerability to international pressure for political 
change. Because of the recent proliferation of global agreements and advocacy 
networks, governments desiring ‘legitimacy and financial capital will want to 
demonstrate their human rights and democratic credentials’ (Htun and Weldon, 2010, 
p. 212).  
This study will systematically address the question of whether trade and 
investment linkages can diffuse the empowerment of women from high-standard 
countries to laggards. We also study the effect of general openness to trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI), understood as the extent of a country’s integration 
into the global economy, even if this is not the central focus of our argument and 
analysis. Equally important is clarity about what we do not analyze, namely the 
effects of certain policies such as capital account liberalization, trade liberalization, 
investment incentives etc. often associated with globalization. In other words, we 
analyze the effect of factual globalization and not policies often associated with being 
open to global processes. Similarly, while trade and FDI are two central aspects of 
globalization, we acknowledge that globalization has many other features (such as 
migration and the illegal trafficking of people, for example) not addressed in our 
analysis. 
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Existing studies have typically analyzed the effect of general trade openness 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) on women’s empowerment, but they do not 
distinguish with whom a country transacts. Moreover, while some studies address a 
broad array of measures of women’s rights, women’s status and material outcomes 
(see, for example, Elson, 1999, Benería, 2003; Seguino, 2006, Van Staveren, Elson, 
Grown & Çağatay, 2007), many studies only cover the employment ratio of women 
and the gender wage gap (Fontana, Joekes & Masika, 1998; Tzannatos, 1999; 
Artecona & Cunningham, 2002; Denis, 2003; Black & Brainerd, 2004; Berik et al. 
2004; Braunstein & Brenner, 2007; Oostendoorp, 2009; Villarreal & Yu, 2007). As 
some argue, increased employment and higher wages do not amount to empowerment 
if exploitation and abuse accompany these positives (Çağatay & Ertürk, 2004; Elson, 
1999; Fontana & Wood, 2000; Morrisson & Jütting, 2005; Standing, 1999) and while 
globalization may increase female employment and earnings in some countries, it may 
well reduce them in others (Kucera & Milberg, 2000). 
Our research therefore departs from previous studies in two important ways. 
First, we employ broader measures of women’s rights that include both economic and 
social rights, such as marriage and divorce rights, the right of movement, the right to 
property, the right to participate in social activities, the right to education, the right to 
inherit etc. Together, women’s economic and social rights are a better gauge of 
female empowerment than simple measures of the wage-gap and employment ratios 
(Moghadam, 2007). We use data from Cingranelli and Richards (2009) covering the 
period 1981 to 2007 that largely measure the fulfilment of these rights in practice 
rather than their mere existence in legal documents alone. Secondly, we examine 
whether it matters with whom one trades and receives FDI from, whereas existing 
studies have examined general openness to trade and FDI. For example, if a country 
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mainly trades with and receives FDI from countries that violate rights, we would not 
expect domestic rights to flourish, an argument often made about African trade with 
China (Taylor, 2006). Given the many arguments around the issue of globalization 
that focus on spill-over via transnational linkages, such effects should be explicitly 
modelled to test these arguments (see, similarly, Greenhill, Mosley & Prakash (2009) 
on trade-based diffusion of general labour rights). 
 
2. SPATIAL DEPENDENCE IN WOMEN’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
Much of the literature on globalization and gender rights is critical of globalization’s 
effects on women. This is generally consistent with many of the views expressed by 
NGOs and other parts of civil society that similarly see globalization as something to 
be resisted because, amongst other things, it dis-empowers women at the hands of the 
patriarchy and authority of male-dominated global capital. Sceptics of globalization 
see the trade and FDI links as exploitative, leading to the lowering of standards due to 
the profit motives of globalized capital via a race to the bottom, or at least leading to a 
reluctance of the laggards to raise standards (the ‘regulatory chill’ thesis) (see the 
discussion and references cited in Mosley & Uno, 2007). Underlying such predictions 
is the oft-made assumption that enhanced women’s economic and social rights would 
add to production costs and thus decrease a country’s competitiveness in globalized 
markets, providing an economic incentive for lagging countries to oppose tightening 
(see, for example, Wichterich, 2000; Elias, 2004; Shiva, 2005; Enloe, 2007; Klein, 
2007). 
Yet, this literature has recently come under criticism for missing the 
multifaceted ways in which women are affected by globalization; interestingly, some 
of this criticism is raised by scholars and writers very sympathetic to women’s causes 
 7 
(Davids & Van Driel, 2005; Lenz, Ullrich & Fersch 2007; Young, 2001). As some 
have written, ‘globalization cannot be viewed only as a nightmare scenario (…) one 
has to recall that the reconfiguration of the Fordist gender order also offers an 
opportunity for women to develop new strategies to achieve gender equality on a 
global scale’ (Young, 2001, p. 46–47). These arguments critical of the globalization 
critics are based on the observation that women are not mere passive receivers of 
hardship but are active agents that navigate social, economic and political life and to 
whom globalization offers new opportunities for challenging existing injustices. Such 
arguments are reminiscent of earlier arguments about the spread of modernization that 
allows women a greater part in the social, political and economic lives of societies. 
Modernization theorists would argue that greater contact between backward countries 
and more modern economies are likely to raise women’s rights in the backward 
countries since forces of modernization threaten patriarchy and the discrimination 
against women (Donno and Russett, 2004). 
Globalization optimists thus submit that openness to trade and FDI promote 
women’s rights by increasing the opportunities for women to challenge traditional 
ways, partly due to the advance of modernization. Yet, what should matter more than 
openness per se is the fact that trade and FDI link countries with high standards to 
those that have lower standards, which could trigger processes of diffusion from the 
high-standard to the low-standard countries. The phenomenon where policies, 
standards or similar choices of one unit of analysis depend on the choices of other 
units of analysis is commonly known as spatial dependence and the hypothesis tested 
in this article is of spatial dependence in women’s economic and social rights working 
via trade and FDI effects. Specifically, it is suggested that the incentive to raise 
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women’s rights is stronger where, firstly, major trading partners and, secondly, the 
major source countries for FDI themselves provide strong rights. 
From a theoretical perspective, spatial dependence can result from coercion, 
competition, externalities, learning or emulation (Simmons & Elkins, 2004). In other 
words, units of analysis, call them agents, change their behavior because others 
pressurize them to (Levi-Faur, 2005), because they need to find a competitive 
advantage (Basinger & Hallerberg, 2004), because the strategies carried out by other 
agents affect the payoffs they generate from their own behavior (Genschel & 
Plümper, 1997), because agents learn that other strategies proved to be more 
successful (Mooney, 2001; Meseguer, 2005), or because they want to mimic the 
behavior of others (Weyland, 2005). 
For the case of spatial dependence in women’s economic and social rights 
working via trade and FDI links, strict coercion is unlikely to be a prominent channel 
of diffusion, even though the US and the European Union (EU) seem to have become 
more inclined recently to make improvements in general labor rights, which could 
have indirect advantages for women, a precondition for granting increased access to 
their domestic markets. Persuasion and pressure are more likely candidates than strict 
coercion, however. In an increasingly mobile world, advocacy networks provide 
transparency and information to consumers, creating greater awareness, not least 
because Western advocacy networks act as watchdogs who tie up with similar 
networks across the globe (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Slaughter, 2004). The global 
women’s movement plays an important role as it connects groups from different 
countries, allowing them to learn from and draw strength from each other as well as to 
monitor the state of women worldwide and exert pressure for improvements (Naples 
& Desai, 2002). Since globalized companies are likely to value their brand names 
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more than local enterprises, these companies will be more sensitive to image (Fung, 
O’Rourke & Sabel, 2001). Multinational corporations are increasingly pressured by 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) codes into conforming to norms and values of 
consumers. Hence, investors and sub-contractors from foreign source countries in 
which women’s rights are protected might be prone to employ and push for similar 
rights for women in the countries in which they invest or sub-contract, such that 
countries which receive most of their FDI from foreign countries in which women’s 
rights are high or export most of their goods and services to these countries should 
experience upward pressure on their domestic standards. 
Competition and externalities are also likely reasons for spatial dependence in 
addition to persuasion and pressure. Thus, countries, which export most of their goods 
and services to foreign markets, in which women’s rights are high, or receive most of 
their FDI from these countries, might find it more difficult to treat women badly as 
this creates negative externalities on consumers and possibly also investors abroad 
who react adversely to such behavior. Vulnerability to global pressure is an important 
aspect of trying to understand why the application of women’s rights has occurred 
among diverse countries (democracies and autocracies, rich and poor etc.). More 
globalized countries naturally are likely to be more, not less vulnerable to such 
pressure, particularly from global advocacy networks that name and shame 
governments and multinational corporations (Htun & Weldon, 2010; Spar, 1998). Yet, 
it is also likely that suppressing women’s rights will lead to lower bargaining power 
of female employees and thus to lower labor costs, which all other things equal will 
be attractive to foreign investors and can spur exports, as Seguino (2000a, 2000b) 
argues. Therefore, with two opposing effects operating simultaneously, whether 
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improved women’s rights can provide countries with a competitive advantage rather 
than a disadvantage is essentially an empirical question.  
Finally, globalization optimists also believe that emulation and learning effects 
can lead to the transfer of best practices in women’s rights to other countries. Links 
created by globalization can spur the spread of norms, rights and values associated 
with a modern and liberal economy and society from private actors in high-standard 
to private actors in low-standard countries (Held & McGrew, 2002). In addition, we 
should see the diffusion of public policies adopted in developed countries, where 
women’s rights are typically higher, to developing countries where such rights are 
typically lower or missing (Simmons & Elkins, 2004). While emulation and learning 
effects will not exclusively stem from one’s trading and foreign investment partners, 
of course, such effects depend on cues for normatively desirable behavior. Such cues 
are likely to come, at least in part, from foreign trading partners and foreign investors, 
which provide direct personal contact and thus afford a direct contrast to and 
comparison with domestic standards. There is a large amount of harmonization of 
standards in the legal sphere and globalized markets could encourage the upward 
harmonization of institutional and regulatory arrangements (Sachs & Warner, 1995). 
The elimination of discrimination against women is the explicit objective of ILO’s 
‘Equal Renumeration Convention’ (No. 100) from 1951 and is covered in other 
agreements with more general remits such as the ‘Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention’ (No. 111) from 1958. While these treaties are old and 
precede the recent wave of globalization, the ILO’s ‘Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’ from 1977 
(revised in 1991 and 2001), and the United Nations’ ‘Global Compact’ corporate 
social responsibility standard from 2001 (see Lozano & Boni, 2002) fall into this 
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period and also cover women’s rights. In sum, why globalization matters can be 
understood as the combination of self-interest of economic actors, incentives for 
harmonization, the diffusion of best practices, the harmonization of legal standards, 
and the active mobilization for improved rights by civil society actors and women 
groups in particular (both local and foreign and linked via the global women’s 
movement), all converging to pressure change. 
 Globalization is likely to have a more direct effect on female empowerment 
through economic rights than social rights. This is not least because men have more to 
gain from women achieving higher economic rights compared to women gaining 
higher social rights. While discrimination against women will always benefit at least 
some men and thus create entrenched interests in perpetuating such discrimination as 
a form of rent-seeking (Braunstein, 2008), gender discrimination is also inefficient 
and costly on the macro-level because productive capacity is not maximized. 
Restricting women’s economic rights is likely to be more costly in economic terms to 
men than restricting women’s social rights. 
However, there are good reasons why social rights are also affected by 
globalization. First, the fulfilment of some social rights is a prerequisite for achieving 
economic rights. For example, the economic rights of free choice of profession and 
equality in hiring and promotion practices requires women’s right to an education, the 
freedom to choose a residence/domicile and even the freedom to travel, marry whom 
they want, obtain a passport, and inherit property. Second, economic and social rights 
tend to be strongly correlated (at r = .72 in our sample) because women’s rights can 
only be comprehensively achieved if both economic and social rights are fulfilled.1 
Access to equal social rights in turn allows women greater voice and participation in 
economic and political realms. Another reason for the positive correlation between the 
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two types of rights is that improved women’s economic rights is likely to lead to 
greater bargaining power and thus greater economic power of women, which enables 
them to press for improved social rights. Women are active agents of social change, 
not merely passive recipients of governmental policies and they will not be content 
with improved economic rights without concurrent improvements in social rights. The 
same forces that promote women’s economic rights are therefore likely to have a 
positive impact on social rights as well. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
(a) Dependent variables 
The measures of women’s economic and social rights are taken from Cingranelli and 
Richards’ (2009) Human Rights Database. These data are also utilized by specialized 
agencies monitoring the progress of women (UNIFEM, 2008). While it is impossible 
to assess the validity of the codings given there is no equally comprehensive 
competing dataset and it is impossible to know the true state of women’s rights across 
the world, it is encouraging to note that Cingranelli and Richards (2009) provide their 
coders with very detailed information on how to code the rights, on where to find 
definitions on potentially unfamiliar terms, and on how to code with limited 
information available. They also provide coders with detailed narratives in 
justification for how selected country year examples should be coded. Moreover, each 
data point is coded by two trained coders for purposes of quality control and the inter-
coder reliability statistics is very high, as described in Cingranelli and Richards 
(2010). Table 1 lists the economic and social rights covered in the database.  
< Table 1 around here > 
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Note that the economic rights almost exlusively refer to employee rights, while 
social rights include two rights (the right to equal inheritance and the right to own, 
acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage) that might be considered 
an economic rather than a social right. Cingranelli and Richards (2009) code women’s 
rights on an ordinal scale from 0 to 3 in the following manner: 
 
(0) There are no economic (social) rights for women under law and systematic 
discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a 
high level of discrimination against women. 
(1) There are some economic (social) rights for women under law. However, in 
practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement 
of laws is weak. The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination 
against women. 
(2) There are some economic (social) rights for women under law. In practice, the 
government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still 
tolerates a low level of discrimination against women. 
(3) All or nearly all of women's economic (social) rights are guaranteed by law. In 
practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The 
government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women 
 
The data are coded on the basis of the United States State Department’s Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, which contain information on how women are 
treated in every country. They do not merely rely on rights in formal laws since rights 
on the books may not match rights in practice. However, UNIFEM (2008) reports that 
a measure of gender empowerment (GEM) index constructed with the Cingranelli and 
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Richards data corresponds quite closely to a measure of an enabling legal 
environment for gender empowerment (GEEE). For a detailed description of coding 
rules and for how ambiguous cases are treated, see Cingranelli and Richards (2008). 
 
(b) Explanatory variables 
The main explanatory variables are what is known as spatial lag variables. They 
capture the dependent variable (i.e. women’s rights) in foreign countries, weighted by 
some link function connecting each country to its trading partners and the sending 
countries of FDI. For the purpose of the analysis here, the weighting matrix measures 
bilateral trade between foreign countries k and domestic country i as well as, in 
separate spatial lag variables, FDI stocks of countries k in country i. The weighting-
matrix is row-standardized.2 This is regarded as common practice (Plümper and 
Neumayer, 2010), but it is also justified here since we are interested merely in the 
identity of foreign trade and investment partners, while the extent of general trade and 
FDI openness are measured by separate variables. With row-standardization, the 
spatial lag variables represent the weighted average of the dependent variable in 
foreign countries, where the weights are the share that foreign countries have in the 
trade and inward FDI stock of the country under observation. Formally, the spatial lag 
variables are defined as 1 1
trade
ikt kt
k
w y
− −∑  and 1 1
FDI
ikt kt
k
w y
− −∑  with bilateral trade and 
inward FDI stocks as the respective connectivity variables between country i and 
foreign countries k. Having defined these formally, we will label these variables as 
trade- and FDI-weighted spatial lag variables, respectively, in the tables. 
Spatial patterns in women’s rights do not need to be caused by spatial 
dependence. Instead, these patterns might be caused by spatial correlation in other 
factors influencing or stimulating the dependent variable. Observable as well as 
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unobservable phenomena such as cultures and customs, preferences and perceptions, 
constitutions and institutions, and so on are typically spatially clustered, which leads 
to spatial patterns in the dependent variable, even in the absence of spatial 
dependence. Morrisson and Jütting (2005) show that there are important regional 
differences with respect to social institutions reflecting long-standing norms, customs 
and traditions, such as genital mutilation and dress codes, marriage, parenting, 
inheritance, ownership and movement rights. Even within regions, there can be 
important differences across countries. Ross (2008) argues that women in oil-rich 
countries are systematically disadvantaged because of a lack of industrialization and 
modernization. 
Distinguishing such spatial clustering or unobserved spatial heterogeneity from 
spatial dependence is a problem commonly known as Galton’s (1889) problem. If 
spatial clustering is not adequately modeled, then a spatial analysis will spuriously 
suggest spatial dependence. In other words, the challenge is to identify the true spatial 
effect. Identification rests on the assumption that all the spatial pattern of the 
dependent variable that has nothing to do with spatial dependence itself is fully 
explained by the independent variables other than the spatial lag. This is a strong 
assumption, and if it does not hold, then the estimated coefficients for the spatial 
effects are likely to be biased. 
A popular method for mitigating the problem created by spatial clustering is the 
inclusion of country fixed effects. Such models take out all of the between variation in 
the data and are estimated based on the within variation of the data in each 
observational unit only. This reduces bias because any spatial clustering or 
unobserved spatial heterogeneity in levels of women’s rights is fully captured by the 
fixed effects. However, the inclusion of fixed effects not only makes the estimates 
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less efficient, but in our specific research context, where we use ordered logit for 
estimating models with a categorical dependent variable, there is no fixed-effects 
estimator (more on this below). 
Another problem of spatial analysis in cross-sectional time-series analysis is the 
problem of common shocks and common trends, such as a general increase in 
awareness of women’s rights over time, possibly following from the UN decade for 
women (1976-1985) or the World Conferences on Women. We control for this by 
including year-specific time fixed effects, i.e. separate intercepts for each year of the 
period of study, as well as the temporally lagged dependent variable. Note, however, 
that the sample means of women’s economic and social rights are almost constant 
over the study period. In other words, while rights have improved in some countries, 
they have deteriorated in others and on average they have not changed much over 
time. 
As control variables, we include general trade openness measured as the ratio of 
the sum of exports and imports to GDP (trade/GDP) taken from the World Bank 
(2009), general openness to FDI measured as the value of the total stock of inward 
FDI relative to GDP (FDI/GDP) taken from UNCTAD (2009),3 the natural log of per 
capita income (lnGDPpc) in constant US$ of 2000 at market exchange rates taken 
from World Bank (2009), and the polity2 variable from the Polity IV data as a 
measure of democracy (democracy), which is taken from Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr. 
(2006).4 It would have been preferable to use GDP data in purchasing-power-parity 
rather than at market exchange rates, but the former has more missing data compared 
to the latter and we wish to have as large a sample size as possible. The Polity IV 
project offers the broadest coverage of all democracy indicators. Codings on a 21-
point scale from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic) are based on expert 
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evaluations of the political regime in countries, relying on a fairly comprehensive 
definition of democracy, which includes electoral rules and various measures of the 
openness of political institutions and aspects of institutionalized democracy and 
autocracy. 
The inclusion of general trade and FDI openness is important to separate the effect 
of general openness from the spatial lags. Per capita income is included since more 
economically developed countries are likely to have higher women’s rights (Forsythe, 
Korzeniewicz and Durrant, 2000; Ross, 2008).5 Also, in more democratic societies 
women have a voice as voters, which is likely to translate into better rights for 
women. 
In sum, variants of the following model are estimated: 
 
1 1 2 3 4 5ln / /it i it it it it ity y GDPpc democracy trade GDP FDI GDPα β β β β β−= + + + + +  
 6 1 1 7 1 1
trade FDI
ikt kt ikt kt t it
k k
w y w y uβ β δ
− − − −
+ + + +∑ ∑    (1) 
 
Where i ( )k≠  stands for the country under observation, t for time, the control 
variables are defined as described above and 1 1
trade
ikt kt
k
w y
− −∑  and 1 1
FDI
ikt kt
k
w y
− −∑  are 
the, respectively, trade- and FDI-weighted spatial lag variables as defined above, iα  
represent country fixed effects (replaced by regional fixed effects in some 
estimations), tδ  time fixed effects. Note that the spatial lag variables are temporally 
lagged by one year since it is very unlikely that they could exert a contemporaneous 
effect. Table 2 provides summary descriptive variable information and table 3 a 
correlation matrix. Other than women’s economic and social rights and their 
respective trade- or FDI-weighted spatial lag variables, which are highly correlated 
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with each other, correlations are not particularly high. In particular, the correlation 
between the trade- and the FDI-weighted spatial lag variables for either set of rights is 
fairly modest at .26, which suggests that they measure different types of 
connectivities. In other words, a typical country’s trading partner is not simply 
identical to or close to identical to a typical country’s foreign investors and the two 
spatial lag variables thus truly tap into distinct aspects of globalization. 
< Tables 2 and 3 around here > 
 
(c) Estimation Technique 
Women’s economic and social rights, the dependent variables, are measured as 
ordered categorical variables, which take on values of zero, one, two or three. Thus, 
ordered logit or probit are appropriate estimation techniques. Unfortunately, these 
models cannot estimate country fixed effects.6 As a compromise, we include regional 
rather than country fixed effects in ordered logit estimations, with dummy variables 
following the World Bank’s (2009) classification of countries into regions. We start 
with a model that contains these regional dummy variables and time-specific fixed 
effects. We then add the lagged dependent variable. Finally, we use a different 
estimator to include country-specific fixed effects, namely Arrelano and Bover’s 
(1995) system-GMM estimator. This estimator is preferable to a standard fixed effects 
estimator since it can treat both the lagged dependent variable and the spatial lag 
variables as endogenous. The inclusion of the temporally lagged dependent variable in 
a fixed effects model leads to so-called Nickell (1981) bias because the lagged 
dependent variable will be correlated with the error term. The endogeneity of the 
spatial lag variable follows from the fact that if foreign countries k have an effect on 
country i, then country i also has a (small) effect on foreign countries k. This is not to 
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be confused with potential reverse causality, which would occur if domestic women’s 
rights influence the identity of foreign trade and investment partners, thus 
representing another reason for potential endogeneity.7 Kukenova and Monteiro 
(2009) show in Monte Carlo simulations that the system-GMM estimator outperforms 
other estimators for spatial dynamic panel data models with one or more endogenous 
variables, which is why we use this estimator. Using too many instruments can bias 
the GMM estimation results (Roodman, 2007). We have therefore restricted the 
maximum lag of instruments to eight. For both ordered logit and GMM estimations, 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering of observations on countries. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
(a) Some descriptive case examples 
Before reporting results from multivariate regression analysis, we briefly discuss a 
few descriptive cases. Good examples for the potential positive effect that women’s 
economic rights in a country’s major trading and investment partners can have on 
domestic rights are Brazil, Mexico and Singapore. The average trade-weighted spatial 
lag variable increased between the first three years and the last three years of our 
study period in these countries from 1.42 to 1.89, from 1.80 to 2.67 and from 0.97 to 
1.51, respectively. Similarly, the values of the FDI-weighted spatial lag variable 
increased in these countries from 1.79 to 2.20, from 2.04 to 2.49 and from 1.47 to 
2.24, respectively. What this means is that women’s rights in these countries’ trading 
and FDI partners have increased and/or that these countries switched to trading and 
FDI partners with higher women’s rights in the sense of trading and receiving FDI 
more from high-standards relative to low-standards countries. At the same time, 
women’s economic rights improved in these countries. In Brazil, women’s economic 
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rights moved from 1 to 2.33, in Mexico they moved from 1 to 2 and in Singapore 
from 1.33 to 2 on our measure. That is, in all of these countries, the situation for 
women improved over the study period because governments started to enforce 
women’s economic rights and only tolerated a low level of discrimination against 
women’s economic rights rather than a moderate level of discrimination, as at the start 
of the period,. 
Singapore is also telling as an example, as it goes to show that improvements 
in women’s economic rights need not go hand in hand with women’s social rights, 
which essentially stayed at a low level in this country. In contrast, Brazil and Mexico 
achieved higher women’s social rights in tandem with improved women’s economic 
rights. All three countries experienced increasing values in the trade- and FDI-
weighted spatial lag variables for women’s social rights as well, similar to the 
increasing values of these variables for women’s economic rights.8 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Myanmar are good examples 
where lower values of the spatial lag variables over time, which means lower values 
of women’s rights in a country’s major trading and FDI partner and/or a switch of 
partners toward countries with lower rights, went hand in hand with deteriorating 
domestic women’s economic and social rights. In the DRC, the situation went from 1 
to 0 for both rights, while in Myanmar it went from 2 to 0.33 (economic rights) and 
from 2 to 0 (social rights), that is, basically no rights in either country at the end of the 
study period. In the case of Myanmar, one may wonder whether the deterioration in 
women’s rights is simply down to the political regime in this country. However, 
Myanmar was as autocratic at the beginning of the 1980s as it was during the end of 
our study period. Still, clearly the examples presented in this brief descriptive analysis 
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are deficient in the sense that they neither control for other, confounding factors nor 
test for a general trend, which is why we turn to multivariate regression analysis now. 
 
(b) Multivariate regression analysis 
Table 4 reports estimation results for women’s economic rights for up to 152 
countries over the period 1981 to 2007. Models 1 to 3 refer to a sample of all 
countries, models 4 to 6 to a sample of developing countries. Results from model 1 
suggest that women’s rights are higher in richer and more democratic as well as in 
countries more open to trade. Higher rights abroad seem to spill-over both via trade 
and FDI links into higher domestic rights. However, this result needs to be treated 
with great care as neither the lagged dependent variable nor country fixed effects are 
yet included.  
< Table 4 around here > 
In model 2, we add the temporally lagged dependent variable. The results 
remain consistent with the ones in model 1. In model 3, country fixed effects are 
included and the estimator switches from ordered logit to system-GMM. Results are 
similar to the ordered logit results in terms of the sign of coefficients and their 
statistical significance, but the spatial lag variable working via FDI links now 
becomes statistically insignificant. The degree of spatial dependence indicates by 
‘how much’ domestic rights increase for a one unit increase in the spatial lag variable, 
which due to row-standardization of the weighting matrix is in the same unit as the 
dependent variable itself. It is roughly .17 in the short run and .35 in the long run. In 
other words, if women’s economic rights in a country’s main trade partners were to 
rise by one point, then this is predicted to raise domestic rights by 0.17 points in the 
short run and by a bit more than one third of a point in the long run.9 The latter is 
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equivalent to about one half of a standard deviation of observed values in women’s 
economic rights, implying that the effect of spatial dependence is not only statistically 
significantly different from zero, but also substantively important. 
Models 4 to 6 repeat the same set of estimations for a sample of developing 
countries only. Results on the control variables are largely compatible with the ones 
reported for the full sample. However, the FDI-weighted spatial lag variable is no 
longer statistically significant. The trade-weighted spatial lag variable remains 
statistically significant in models 4 and 5, but becomes (marginally) statistically 
insignificant in the system-GMM estimations. Note that Arellano-Bond tests of 
autocorrelation in the system-GMM estimations of models 3 and 6 violate the 
assumption of no second-order autocorrelation required for system-GMM to produce 
valid results. We therefore re-estimated these models with an assumed first-order 
moving average error process and including two further temporal lags of the 
dependent and one further lag of the endogenous spatial lag variables. The (non-
reported) results suggest that the first temporal lag of the trade-weighted spatial lag 
variable has a statistically significant positive effect on women’s economic rights in 
both the full and the developing country only sample. This further corroborates the 
finding of positive spatial dependence working via trade links. 
Table 5 reports results for women’s social rights, following the same set of 
estimations as in table 4. Results vary a bit more depending on the sample and the 
estimation model chosen, compared with the results on women’s economic rights. 
Higher women’s social rights seem to be associated with higher per capita income, 
but only in the full sample. The same is true for democracy (with only one exception, 
democracy is insignificant in the developing countries sample). On the whole, 
countries that are more open to trade in general have higher women’s social rights. 
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Countries that are more open to FDI in general have higher social rights, but with one 
exception the coefficients of this variable are statistically insignificant for the sample 
that only contains developing countries. The FDI-weighted spatial lags are 
statistically significant only in two out of the six models. This suggests that there is no 
consistent evidence for higher women’s social rights abroad spreading via FDI links. 
In contrast, there is consistent evidence across all model specifications for spill-over 
effects on social rights via trade links. Comparing models 3 and 6, the degree of 
spatial dependence is somewhat lower in the sample of developing countries in 
comparison with the full sample, both in the short-run (.18 compared to .32) and in 
the long run (.32 compared to .58). What this implies is that developing countries are 
less affected by spill-over effects in women’s social rights than developed countries. 
A possible explanation is that women’s social rights might be more culturally 
entrenched and thus less amenable to change from the outside in developing 
countries. For women’s social rights, Arellano and Bond tests of autocorrelation did 
not reject the hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation required for the system-
GMM estimator to produce valid results. 
< Table 5 around here > 
In table 6, we split up the developing country sample into low- and middle-
income countries. Whilst we cannot account for the gender structure of employment 
in the tradeables sector or in the production processes operated or controlled by 
foreign investors directly, it is plausible that female employment in these sectors is 
more relevant in middle-income countries than in low-income countries. If so, 
spillover effects should be more relevant in middle-income compared to low-income 
countries.10 Results reported in table 5 corroborate this hypothesis: there is evidence 
of spatial dependence in middle-income countries, consistent with the results found 
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for all countries or for the developing country sample, but no evidence of spatial 
dependence in low-income countries. Note that for women’s economic rights, there is 
even evidence for spillover effect working via FDI links, suggesting that higher 
women’s economic rights in a country’s main foreign investment partners leads to 
higher domestic rights in middle-income countries. 
< Table 6 around here > 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Women’s empowerment plays a central role in the development debate. How does 
globalization affect women’s rights? In contrast to others, this article has analyzed 
this question in two distinct ways. First, we focused on spatial dependence, addressing 
whether higher women’s rights abroad spill-over into higher domestic rights via 
transnational trade and FDI linkages. Secondly, we employed broad measures of 
women’s rights that included both economic and social rights. The question of 
whether higher women’s economic and social rights among a country’s major trade 
partners and investment sources spill-over into higher domestic levels of such rights is 
a crucial aspect of the globalization debate. 
We found consistent evidence for spill-over effects working via trade links for 
both sets of rights in all samples but the one restricted to low-income countries only. 
With one exception, this result was independent of the model specification. We found 
only weak and limited evidence of spill-over effects via FDI links for women’s 
economic or social rights. Only in middle-income countries do we find consistent 
evidence for such an effect on women’s economic rights, independently of the model 
specification. Going beyond spatial dependence, we found evidence suggesting that 
general trade openness is conducive to higher women’s economic rights whereas 
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general FDI openness does not matter, two results which corroborate with updated 
data and a different estimation strategy results previously reported in Neumayer and 
de Soysa (2007). General trade openness also seems to promote women’s social 
rights, while general FDI openness appears conducive to such rights, but not in 
developing countries. 
In conclusion, general trade openness as well as spill-over effects working via 
trade links appear to be aspects of globalization that have a beneficial impact on 
women’s rights.11 Whether better women’s rights in absolute terms translate into 
higher gender equality in rights is difficult to say given we have no measure of men’s 
economic and social rights. We would, however, point out that, firstly, women’s 
rights are coded in a way as to partly refer to gender equality (e.g., “equal pay for 
equal work”, “equality in hiring and promotion practices”, “the right to equal 
inheritance”) and, secondly, because men will invariably enjoy many of the relevant 
rights already, any absolute improvements for women will typically translate into 
higher gender equality as well. More questionable is whether improved rights will 
lead to improved material outcomes for women, which should be a prime objective of 
future research. The two measures of women’s rights are only modestly correlated 
(below 0.4) with the ratio of female to male earnings and the gender-related human 
development index (HDI) as a percentage of the overall HDI (data taken from UNDP 
2009). Moreover, globalization takes many forms beyond the ones looked at here and 
it will have many different effects and will affect some people positively whilst others 
negatively. However, when it comes to fundamental economic and social rights for 
women, on average the specific forms of globalization looked at here are beneficial 
rather than harmful to the empowerment of women. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 The same is true of course for women’s political rights, but the vast majority of countries grant 
women ‘good’ to ‘very good’ political rights already (Paxton et al. 2006). In terms of actual 
representation in national parliaments, most countries have only a small share of female 
parliamentarians, however. 
2
 Note that because of row-standardization, it makes no difference whether for the purpose of creating 
the spatial lag variables, FDI and trade are measured in absolute terms or relative to country i’s GDP or 
gross fixed capital formation. 
3
 FDI stocks relative to GDP has better data availability than FDI stocks relative to gross capital 
formation, which is why we prefer the former. Note, however, that results are robust to using FDI 
stocks relative to gross capital formation instead. 
4
 Other variables, such as women’s mobilization used in Huber, Stephen, Bradly, Moller & Nielsen. 
(2009) are more the consequence of women’s rights than a determinant. 
5
 Boserup (1970) suggests that the relationship might be non-linear with economic development first 
providing men with preferential access to economic resources, only benefiting women after a threshold 
level of economic development has been reached and women start entering the paid workforce. Some 
feminists even suggest that economic development might increase economic discrimination against 
women (Charlton, 1997). In pre-tests we included a squared income term to account for Boserup’s 
hypothesis of non-linear relationship, but did not find it to be statistically significant. For this reason, 
income enters the estimations reported below only linearly. 
6
 The statistic for computing a fixed-effects ordered logit or probit model is extremely complex, and 
there does not exist a routine in STATA currently, or to our knowledge at least, any other standard 
econometrics package to estimate such a model. Adding “by hand” country fixed effects to the ordered 
probit or logit estimator leads to biased coefficients and standard errors (Stata, 2003). 
7
 Is reverse causality likely to represent a problem? Busse and Spielmann (2005) report evidence that a 
higher gender wage gap promotes the export of labor-intensive goods, whereas the opposite is the case 
for gender inequality in labor force activity and educational attainment rates. In a country study of 
South Korea, Seguino (1997) finds that the gender wage gap can explain some of the country’s growth 
in exports. As concerns FDI, both Kucera (2002) and Busse and Spielmann (2003) find no evidence 
that greater gender inequality attracts foreign investors. While the existing evidence is thus mixed, we 
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cannot exclude the possibility that higher women’s rights leads to more inward FDI or more trade. 
Note, however, that contrary to our general trade and FDI openness variables, our row-standardized 
spatial lag variables are not affected by this reverse causality if inward FDI from all source countries 
and trade with all partner countries go up similarly in response to higher women’s rights. For the 
spatial lag variables, reverse causality is only an issue if higher domestic women’s rights also affect the 
identity of foreign trade and investment partners, which we cannot exclude as a possibility. 
8
 In order to provide some concrete examples of how women’s rights have improved in one of the 
countries mentioned in this section, take Brazil. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution contains “some of the 
most advanced legislation and innovative mechanisms to advance women’s rights” (Htun, 2002, p. 
736) and while there are many enforcement issues, this progressive legislation was followed by a 1999 
law designed to create incentives to hire more female employees, a change to the civil code in 2001 
that grants men and women equality in marriage and a 2002 law that grants adoptive mothers the right 
to maternity leave and benefits (Htun, 2002). In the judgment of Lovell (2006, p. 80), despite many 
persistent problems Brazilian women “have made remarkable progress over the past four decades in 
securing hard-won legal rights and in gaining access to the highest levels of schooling, entrance into 
higher paying occupations, and narrowing the intraethnic gender wage gap”. 
9
 The asymptotic long-term effect – computed according to Plümper, Troeger & Manow (2005, p. 336) 
– is ( )6 1
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, where T is sufficiently large (typically fifteen or 
more). 
10
 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this. 
11
 The same holds for general FDI openness, but only for women’s social rights and only in the global 
sample. 
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Table 1. Economic and social rights covered in Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010) 
Human Rights Database. 
 
Economic rights: 
• Equal pay for equal work 
• Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or 
male relatives consent 
•  The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male 
relatives consent 
• Equality in hiring and promotion practices 
• Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or 
layoffs, etc...) 
• Non-discrimination by employers 
• The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace 
• The right to work at night 
• The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous 
• The right to work in the military and the police force 
 
Social rights: 
• The right to equal inheritance 
• The right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men 
• The right to travel abroad 
• The right to obtain a passport 
• The right to confer citizenship to children or a husband 
• The right to initiate a divorce 
 38 
• The right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage 
• The right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities 
• The right to an education 
• The freedom to choose a residence/domicile 
• Freedom from female genital mutilation (FGM) of children and of adults without 
their consent 
• Freedom from forced sterilization 
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Table 2. Summary Descriptive Variable Statistics. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
women’s economic rights 2195 1.373 0.653 0 3 
ln itGDPpc  2195 7.752 1.590 4.395 10.654 
itdemocracy  2195 3.986 6.569 -10 10 
/ ittrade GDP  2195 76.407 42.779 6.320 462.463 
/ itFDI GDP  2195 0.167 0.413 0 10.021 
FDI-weighted spatial lag (economic rights) 2195 1.892 0.439 0 3 
trade-weighted spatial lag (economic rights) 2195 1.699 0.247 0.603 2.691 
women’s social rights 1781 1.337 0.829 0 3 
FDI-weighted spatial lag (social  rights) 1781 2.166 0.580 0 3 
trade-weighted spatial lag (social rights) 1781 1.795 0.335 0.713 2.777 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1: women’s economic rights 1          
2: ln itGDPpc  0.5705 1         
3: itdemocracy  0.4399 0.5053 1        
4: / ittrade GDP  0.1544 0.1122 -0.0346 1       
5: / itFDI GDP  0.0735 0.0533 0.0578 0.2378 1      
6: FDI-weighted spatial lag (economic rights) 0.0912 -0.0318 -0.0615 0.0832 -0.011 1     
7: trade-weighted spatial lag (economic rights) 0.2914 0.2674 0.2756 -0.0226 -0.0115 0.2637 1    
8: women’s social rights 0.7220 0.5763 0.5137 0.1047 0.1428 0.0948 0.3240 1   
9: FDI-weighted spatial lag (social  rights) 0.0955 -0.0213 -0.0557 0.0504 -0.0474 0.7626 0.1791 0.0992 1  
10: trade-weighted spatial lag (social rights) 0.3325 0.3089 0.2940 -0.0087 -0.0131 0.1888 0.8125 0.3835 0.2596 1 
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Table 4. Estimation results for women’s economic rights. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All countries Developing countries only 
1ity −  
 3.408*** 0.379***  3.470*** 0.395*** 
  (0.184) (0.0469)  (0.182) (0.0441) 
ln itGDPpc  0.507*** 0.322*** 0.114*** 0.412*** 0.274*** 0.0622*** 
 (0.161) (0.0963) (0.0164) (0.154) (0.0910) (0.0161) 
itdemocracy  0.0710*** 0.0300* 0.0118*** 0.0547** 0.0168 0.00973*** 
 (0.0243) (0.0157) (0.00307) (0.0265) (0.0156) (0.00294) 
/ ittrade GDP  0.00666** 0.00328** 0.000998** 0.00969*** 0.00504*** 0.00169*** 
 (0.00274) (0.00160) (0.000409) (0.00283) (0.00174) (0.000407) 
/ itFDI GDP  0.0749 0.104 0.0161 -0.108 0.00109 -0.0237 
 (0.158) (0.111) (0.0236) (0.119) (0.115) (0.0167) 
FDI-weighted spatial lag 0.581*** 0.459*** 0.0549 0.162 0.205 -0.00253 
 (0.222) (0.151) (0.0547) (0.232) (0.177) (0.0595) 
trade-weighted spatial lag 0.983** 0.682** 0.174* 0.995** 0.624* 0.152 
 (0.444) (0.331) (0.100) (0.490) (0.347) (0.105) 
Countries 152 152 151 131 131 130 
Observations 2195 2165 2157 1731 1701 1693 
 
Note: The estimator is ordered logit in models 1-2 and 4-5 and system-GMM in 
models 3 and 6. Models 1-2 and 4-5 contain regional dummy variables, models 3 and 
6 contain country fixed effects. Year-specific fixed effects always included. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries in parentheses. 
* statistically significant at .1 level,  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Table 5. Estimation results for women’s social rights. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All countries Developing countries only 
1ity −  
 3.565*** 0.563***  3.324*** 0.500*** 
  (0.182) (0.0477)  (0.176) (0.0564) 
ln itGDPpc  0.355** 0.202** 0.0804*** 0.123 0.0995 0.0217 
 (0.179) (0.0889) (0.0171) (0.165) (0.0947) (0.0173) 
itdemocracy  0.0714** 0.0285 0.0132*** 0.0304 0.00527 0.0132*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0182) (0.00378) (0.0274) (0.0173) (0.00362) 
/ ittrade GDP  0.00306 0.00281* 0.000744* 0.0107*** 0.00633*** 0.00168*** 
 (0.00336) (0.00166) (0.000441) (0.00339) (0.00194) (0.000535) 
/ itFDI GDP  0.759** 0.484*** 0.111** 0.248 0.323** 0.0502 
 (0.341) (0.151) (0.0565) (0.222) (0.142) (0.0446) 
FDI-weighted spatial lag 0.581*** 0.273** 0.00143 0.329 0.180 0.00433 
 (0.207) (0.132) (0.0401) (0.261) (0.177) (0.0425) 
trade-weighted spatial lag 1.475*** 0.920*** 0.315*** 1.523*** 0.891*** 0.179* 
 (0.480) (0.279) (0.0954) (0.472) (0.298) (0.0936) 
Countries 147 146 146 126 125 125 
Observations 1781 1734 1734 1397 1355 1355 
 
Note: The estimator is ordered logit in models 1-2 and 4-5 and system-GMM in 
models 3 and 6. Models 1-2 and 4-5 contain regional dummy variables, models 3 and 
6 contain country fixed effects. Year-specific fixed effects always included. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries in parentheses. 
* statistically significant at .1 level,  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Table 6. Estimation results for low-income and middle-income countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (7) 
 economic rights social rights 
 low-income countries middle-income countries low-income countries middle-income countries 
1ity −  3.712*** 0.619*** 3.128*** 0.447*** 3.498*** 0.710*** 3.286*** 0.573*** 
 (0.263) (0.0502) (0.245) (0.0506) (0.326) (0.0454) (0.249) (0.0404) 
ln itGDPpc  0.258 0.0486 0.371** 0.0622** -0.296 -0.0135 0.401** 0.0426 
 (0.257) (0.0345) (0.160) (0.0255) (0.310) (0.0316) (0.167) (0.0260) 
itdemocracy  0.00721 0.00233 0.0372* 0.0118*** 0.0123 0.00285 0.00175 0.0136*** 
 (0.0237) (0.00366) (0.0224) (0.00341) (0.0317) (0.00338) (0.0306) (0.00413) 
/ ittrade GDP  0.0106** 0.00208*** 0.00575** 0.00121** 0.0139*** 0.00220*** 0.00661** 0.00102* 
 (0.00464) (0.000798) (0.00224) (0.000471) (0.00445) (0.000724) (0.00270) (0.000574) 
/ itFDI GDP  -0.0449 -0.0269** 0.384 -0.00189 0.126 0.00944 0.967 0.136 
 (0.0873) (0.0131) (0.542) (0.0820) (0.146) (0.0238) (0.629) (0.118) 
FDI-weighted spatial lag 0.495 -0.00904 0.349* 0.112** 0.318 -0.0215 0.202 0.0230 
 (0.350) (0.0588) (0.202) (0.0466) (0.339) (0.0506) (0.205) (0.0353) 
trade-weighted spatial lag 0.161 -0.0198 1.448*** 0.297*** 0.500 -0.0413 1.471*** 0.225*** 
 (0.665) (0.106) (0.437) (0.0968) (0.694) (0.0959) (0.375) (0.0765) 
Countries 58 57 66 66 53 53 65 65 
Observations 675 673 964 958 553 553 756 756 
 
Note: The estimator is ordered logit in models 1, 3, 5 and 7 and system-GMM in models 2, 4, 6 and 8. Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 contain regional 
dummy variables, models 2, 4, 6 and 8 contain country fixed effects. Year-specific fixed effects always included. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on countries in parentheses. * statistically significant at .1 level,  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
